Impacts on Agency Cost Theory

Impacts on Agency Cost Theory The main purpose of this research is to investigate how the determinants of the capital structure (leverage) and the dividend payout policy impact the agency cost theory. Literature review part picked up the relevant material related to agency theory, leverage, and dividends payout policy. The literature review section goes through the agency cost literature, and explores the financial policies; the capital structure (leverage), and the dividend payout policy and that these policies would influence the agency cost theory. 2.1 Agency theory Literature The notion of the agency theory is widely used in economics, finance, marketing, legal, and social sciences; Jensen and Meckling (1976) initiated and developed it. Capital structure (leverage) for the firms is determined by agency costs, i.e., costs related to conflict of interests between various groups including managers, which have claims on the firm’s resources (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency relationship as â€Å"a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent), to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent† pp.308. Assuming that both parties utility maximizes, the agents are not possible to act in the best interest of the principal. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) contended that the principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent, and by incurring monitoring costs (pecuniary and non pecuniary), which are designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the agency costs are unavoidable, since the agency costs are borne entirely by the owner. Jensen and Meckling (1976) contended that the owner is motivated to see these costs minimized. Authors who initiated and developed the agency theory have argued that if the owner manages a wholly owned firm, then he can make operating decisions that maximise his utility. The agency costs are generated if the owner manager sells equity claims on the firms, which are identical to his.  It also generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he then bears only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out maximizing his own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested two types of conflicts in the firm; First of all, the conflict between shareholders and managers arises because managers hold less than a hundred percent of the residual claim. Therefore, they do not capture the entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, but they do bear the entire cost of these activities. For example, managers can invest less effort in managing firm resources and may be able to transfer firm resources to their own, personal benefit, i.e., by consuming â€Å"perquisites† such as a fringe benefits. The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these activities but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers over indulge in these interests relative to the level that would maximize the firm value. This inefficiency reduced the large fraction of the equity owned by the manager. Holding constant the manager’s absolute investment in the firm, increases in the fraction of the firm financed by debt increases the manager’s share of the equity and mitigates the loss from conflict between the managers and shareholders. Furthermore, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of free cash flow available to managers to engage in these types of interests.  As a result, this reduction of the conflict between managers and shareholders will constitute the benefit of debt financing. Second, they also suggested that the conflict between debt holders and shareholders arises because the debt contract, gives shareholders an incentive to invest sub optimally. Especially when the debt contract provides that, if an investment yields large returns, well above the face value of the debt, shareholders capture most of the gain. However, if the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences. Therefore, shareholders may benefit from investing in very risky projects, even if they are under valued; such investments result in an adverse in the value of debt. Lasfer (1995) argued that debt exacerbates the conflict between debt holders and shareholders. Shareholders will benefit from investments in risky projects at the expense of debt holders.  If the investment yields higher return than the face value of debt, shareholders capture most of the gain, however, if the investment fails, debt holders lose, given that. Therefore, shareholders protected by the limited liability. On the other hand, if the benefits captured by debt holders reduce the returns to shareholders, then an incentive to reject positive net present projects has created. Thus, the debt contract gives shareholders incentives to invest sub optimally. In addition, Myers (1977) argued that the firms with many growth opportunities should not be financed by debt, to reduce the negative net value projects.   Furthermore, some of arguments have been debated that the magnitude of the agency costs varies among firms. It will depend on the tastes of managers, the ease with which they can exercise their own preferences as opposed to value maximization in decision making, and the costs of monitoring and bonding activities. Therefore, the agency costs depend upon the cost of measuring the manager’s performance and evaluating it (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). (Jensen, 1986) either points out that when firms make their financing decision, they evaluate the advantages that may arise from the resolution of the conflicts between managers, shareholders and from long run tax shields.   In addition, Lasfer (1995) argues that debt finance creates a motivation for managers to work harder and make better investment decisions. On the other hand, debt works as a disciplining tool, because default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation. Debt also generates information that can be used by investors to evaluate major operating decisions including liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Jensen (1986) debated that when using debt without retention of the proceeds of the issue, bonds the managers to meet their promise to pay future cash flows to the debt holders. Thus, debt can be an effective substitute for dividends. By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers are bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by simple dividend increases. Consequently, managers give recipients of the debt the right to take the firm to the bankruptcy court if they do not maintain their commitment to make the interest and principle payments. Thus, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. Jensen (1986) claimed that these control effects of debt are a potential determinant of capital structure. In practice, it is possible to reduce the owner manager non pecuniary benefits; by using these instruments external auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment of incentive compensation systems serve to identify the manager’s interests more closely with those of the outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1986) suggested that leverage and dividend may act as a substitute mechanism to reduce the agency costs. Agency cost models predict that dividend payments can reduce the problems related to information asymmetry. Dividend payments might be consider also as a mechanism to reduce cash flow under management control, and help to mitigate the agency problems (Rozeff, 1982, and Easterbrook, 1984). Therefore, paying dividends may have a positive impact on the firms value. â€Å"Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs related to the principal agent relationship, one way to reduce agency costs is to increase dividends† Baker and Powell (1999). They also claim that firm use the dividends use as a tool to monitor the management performance. Moreover, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that agency costs exist in firms because managers may not always want to maximize shareholder’s wealth due to the separation of ownership and control. Jensen (1986) addresses the free cash flow theory, in terms of this theory the conflict of interest between managers and stockholders is rooted in the presence of informational and self interest behavior. He defines the free cash flow as â€Å"cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital† (Jensen,1986). Within the context of the free cash flow hypothesis, firms prefer to increase their dividends and distribute the excess free cash flow in order to reduce agency costs. Consequently, markets react positively to this type of information. This theory is attractive because it is consistent with the evidence about investment and financing decisions (Jensen, 1986, Frankfurter and Wood, 2002). 2.2 Leverage Literature This section reviews the determinants of capital structure by different relevant literatures. Titman and Wessels (1988) study is considered to be one of the leading studies in the developed markets. They tried to extend the empirical work in capital structure theory by examining a much broader set of capital structure theories, and to analyze measures of short term, long term, and convertible debt. The data covers the US industrial companies from 1974 to 1982, and they used a factor analytic approach for estimating the impact of unobservable attributes on the choice of corporate debt ratios. As a result, the study confirms these factors, collateral values of assets, non-debt tax shields, growth, and uniqueness of the business, industry classification, firm size, and firm profitability. They also found that there is a negative relationship between debt levels and the uniqueness of the business. In addition, short term debt ratios have a negative relationship to firm size. However, they do not provide support for the effect on debt ratios arising from non debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value of assets, and growth. In Jordan, Al-Khouri and Hmedat (1992) aimed to find the effect of the earnings variability on capital structure of Jordanian corporations from the period from 1980 to 1988. They included 65 firms. The study used a multivariate regression approach with financial leverage as the dependent variable measured in three ways; first, long term debt over total assets, secondly, short term debt over total assets, and finally, short term debt plus long term debt over total assets. The standard deviation of the earnings variability and the size of the firm measured as independent variables. They concluded that the firm size is considered as a significant factor in determining the capital structure of the firm, and insignificant relationship between the earning variability and financial leverage of the firm. Furthermore, they suggest that the type of industry is not considered as a significant factor in determining the capital structure of the firm. Rajan and Zingales (1995) provided international evidence about the determinants of capital structure. They examined the capital structure in other countries related to factors similar to those that influence United States firms. The database contains 2583 companies in the G7 countries. They used regression analysis with the firm’s leverage (total debt divided by total debt plus total equity) as the dependent variable. Tangible assets, market to book ratio, firm size, and firm profitability used as independent variables. They found that in market bases firms with a lot of fixed assets are not highly levered, however, they supported that a positive relationship exists between tangible assets, and firms size, and capital structure (leverage). On the contrary, they confirmed that there is a negative relationship between leverage and the market to book ratio, and profitability. From the capital structure literature, Ozkan (2001) also investigated that the determinants of the target capital structure of firms and the role of the adjustment process in the UK using a sample of 390 firms. The multiple regression approach (panel data) was used to measure the debts by total debt to total assets, on the one hand. He also used in his model, non debt tax shield, firm size, liquidity, firm profitability, and firm growth as an independent variables. He confirmed that the profit, liquidity, non debt tax shield, and growth opportunities have a negative relationship to capital structure (leverage). Finally, he supported that there is a positive effect arising from size of firms on leverage. The study provided evidence that the UK firms have long term target leverage ratios and that they adjust quickly to their target ratios. The study by Booth et al. (2001) is considered as a one of the leading studies in the developing countries. It aimed to assess whether capital structure theory is applicable across developing countries with different institutional structures. The data include balance sheets and income statements for the largest companies in each selected country from the year 1980 to 1990. It included 10 developing countries: India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Jordan, and Korea. The study used multivariate regression analysis with dependent variables; total debt ratio, long term book debt ratio, and long term market to debt ratio. The independent variables are; average tax rate, tangibility, business risk, firm size, firm profitability, and market to book ratio. Booth et al. found that the more profitable the firm the lower the debt ratio, regardless how the debt ratio is defined. In addition, the higher the tangible assets mix, the higher is the long term debt ratio but the smaller is the total debt ratio. Finally, it concluded that debt ratios in developing countries seem to be affected in the same way by the same set of variables that are significant in developed countries. Voulgaris et al. (2004) investigated the determinants of capital structure for Greek manufacturing firms. The study used panel data of two random samples one for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) including 143 firms and another for large sized enterprises (LSEs) including 75 firms for the period from 1988 to 1996. It used a leverage model as a dependent variable (short run debt ratio, long run debt ratio, and total debt ratio). On the other hand, It used firm size, asset structure, profitability, growth rate, stock level, and receivables as independent variables. The study suggested that there are similarities and differences in the determinants of capital structure among the two samples. The similarities include that the firm size and growth opportunities positively related to leverage. While, they confirm that the profitability has a negative relationship to leverage. Moreover, they pointed out the differences that the inventory period, and account receivables collection period have been found as determinants of debt in SMEs but not in LSEs. Liquidity doest not affect LSEs leverage, but it affects the SMEs. Finally, they also suggested that there is a positive relationship between profit margins and short term debt ratio only for SMEs. Voulgaris et al. (2004) have debated this arguments as; ‘‘the attitude of banks toward small sized firms should be changed so they provide easier access to long-term debt financing’’. In addition, â€Å"enactment of rules that will allow transparency of operations in the Greek stock market and a healthier development of the newly established capital market for SMEs will assist Greek firms into achieving a stronger capital structure’’. 2.3 Dividends payout ratio literature Dividend payout ratios vary between firms and the dividend payout policy will impact the agency cost theory. Rozeff (1982) investigated in his study that the dividends policy will be rationalize by appealing the transaction cost and agency cost associated with external finance. Moreover, Rozeff (1982) had found evidences supporting how the agency costs influence the dividends payout ratio. He found that the firms have distributed lower dividend payout ratios when they have a higher revenue growth, because this growth leads to higher investment expenditures.  This evidence supports the view of the investment policy affect on the dividend policy; the reason for that influences is that would the external finance be costly. Conversely, he found that the firms have distributed higher dividends payouts when insiders hold a lower portion of the equity and (or) a greater numbers of shareholders own the outside equity. Rozeff (1982) pointed out that this evidence supports that the dividend payments are part of the firm’s optimum monitoring and that bonding package reduces the agency costs. Moreover, if the agency cost declines when the dividend payout does and if the transaction cost of external finance increases when the dividend payout is increased as well, then minimization of these costs will lead to a unique optimum for a given firm. In addition, Hansen, Kumar, and Shome [HKS], (1994) pointed out the relevance of the monitoring theory for explaining the dividends policy of regulated electric utilities. From an agency cost perspective, they emphasized their ideas that the dividends promote monitoring of what they call the shareholders regulator conflict. Therefore, it is a monitoring role of dividends. On the contrary, Easterbrook’s (1984) has noted that the dividends monitoring of the shareholders managers conflict. They also have observed that the utilities firms have a discipline of monitoring mechanism for controlling agency cost, depending on the relative cost effectiveness of those costs (Crutchly and Hensen, 1989). The regulator process will impact the conflict between the shareholders and mangers, by mitigate the managers’ power to appropriate shareholders’ wealth and consume perquisites (Hansen et al. 1994). On the other hand, they argued this issue by the cost-plus concept, regulators may set into motion of managerial incentive structure that potentially conflicts with shareholders interests, this concept solve the shareholders-regulators concept since the sources of the conflict lies in differences in the perceptions of what constitutes fair cost plus. Therefore, the regulation can control some of the agency cost while exacerbating others. In their study, they conduct also that the managers and shareholders of unregulated firms have a several mechanisms whether, internal or external, for controlling agency cost. In addition, they observed that the dividend policy to reduce the agency theory is not limited, depending on their findings they suggested that the cost of dividend payout policy might be below the costs paid by other types of firm. In fact the utilities company maintain high debt ratio that would maintain as well as equity agency costs. Aivazian et al. (2003b) compare the dividend policy behaviour of eight emerging markets with dividend policies in the US firms in the period from 1980 to 1990. The sample included firms from; Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. They found that it is difficult to predict dividend changes for such emerging markets. This is because the quality of firms with reputations for cutting dividends is somehow similar to those who increase their dividends, than for the US control sample. In addition, current dividends are less sensitive to past dividends than for the US sample of firms. They also found that the Lintner model[1] does not work well for the sample of emerging markets. These results indicate that the institutional frameworks in these emerging markets make dividend policy a weak technique for signaling future earnings and reducing agency costs than for the US sample of firms. Furthermore, Omran and Pointon (2004) investigated the role of dividend policy in determining share prices, the determinants of payout ratios, and the factors that affect the stability of dividends for a sample of 94 Egyptian firms. They found that retentions are more important than dividends in firms with actively traded shares, but that accounting book value is more important than dividends and earnings for non-actively traded firms. However, when they combined both the actively traded and non-traded firms, they found that dividends are more important than earnings. In the determinants of payout ratios, they found that there is a negative relationship between the leverage ratio and market to book ratio, tangibility, and firm size on the one hand, to the payout ratios in actively traded firms. On the contrary, they also found that there is a positive relationship between the business risk, market to book and firm size (measured by total assets) to payout ratios in non-actively traded firms. Furthermore, for the whole sample, leverage has a positive relationship with payout ratios, while firm size (measured by market capitalization) is negatively related to payout ratios. Finally, the stepwise logistic regression analysis shows that decreasing dividends is associated with lack of liquidity and overall profitability. In addition, increasing dividends is associated with higher overall profitability. 2.4 Summary In this chapter the relevant literatures addressing the reviews of the agency cost theory related to the financial policies. It also gives a theoretical background on how the conflicts of interests arise between the agents (managers) and the principal (shareholders). The second and third sections present the determinants of leverage and dividend payout policy. The following chapter will go through the description of data, and data methodology was employed for this dissertation. 3. Methodology, Research Design and Data Description The aim of the current study is to investigate firstly, the empirical evidence of the determinants of leverage and dividend policy under the agency theory concept for the period 2002-2007. The majority of the previous studies in the field of capital structure have made in the context of developed countries such as USA and UK. It is important to investigate the main determinants of leverage and dividend policy in developing countries where, capital markets, are less developed, less competitive and suffering from the lack of compatible regulations and sufficient supervision This chapter will explain the research methodology of this study. This chapter also identifies the sample of the study. Moreover, it presents an illustration of the econometric techniques that have been employed. In addition, this chapter gives a brief explanation of the specification tests used in the study to identify which technique is the best for the data set. This chapter structured as follows; Section (3.1) presents data description.  Section (3.2) presents the sample of the study. Section (3.3) discusses the econometric techniques employed in the study. Finally, Section (3.4) provides a brief summary. 3.1 Data Description The data used in the study are secondary data for companies listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period of 2002-2007. The data was extracted from the firm’s annual reports, and from Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly Companies Guide, and Amman Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical Bulletins). Data is readily available in the form of CD and on the website of the Amman Stock Exchange. The reason for the study period selection was to minimize the missing observations for the sample companies. Moreover, a different reporting system has been used since 2000. The application of the new reporting system was the result of the transparency act which was launched in 1999, and forced all companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange to disclose their financial information and publish their annual reports according to the International Financial Reporting Standards. In other words, this data series for the period from 2002-2007 was chosen in terms of consistency and comparability purposes. 3.2 Sample of the study The sample of the study consists of the Jordanian Manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for the period of 2002-2007. The total number of the companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2007 was 215. Officially, these companies are divided into four main economic sectors; Banks sector, Insurance sector, Services sector and finally Industrial sector. Moreover, this study is concerned only with Jordanian manufacturing companies that their stocks are traded in the organized market. It is important to note that the capital structure of financial firms has special characteristic when compared to the capital structure of non financial firms, they also have special tax treatment (Lester, 1995). On the other hand, the financial firms have a higher leverage rate, which may tend to make the analysis results biased. Moreover, financial firms their leverage is affected by investor insurance schemes (Rajan and Zingals, 1995). For these reasons, the potential sample of the study consists of non financial (Manufacturing) companies that are still listed in Amman Stock Exchange. The total number of industrial companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2007 was 88 companies, which are 40.93% of the total number of the companies listed in that market. The study conducts the following criteria in selecting the sample upon the Jordanian manufacturing companies by excluding all the firms that was incorporated after year 2002, and all the firms that have merged or acquired during this period, further, the firms have liquidated or delisted by the Amman Stock Exchange, and finally, the study have also excluded the firms that have information missing for that period. The application for those criteria has resulted in 52 samples of manufacturing companies. The data for the variables that are included in the study models is tested using three different econometric techniques which will be discuss briefly in the next sections. 3.3 Econometrics techniques Hairs et al. (1998) argued that the application of econometrics technique depends on the nature of data employed in the study, and to what extent it would be realised to the research objectives. In order to find a best and adequate data model, the current study employs pooled data technique and panel data analysis which is usually estimated by either fixed effect technique or random effects technique.  The following sections provide a brief discussion on the econometrics techniques that the current study uses to estimate the empirical models. 3.3.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique All the models used in the study have been tested by the pooled data analysis technique. The pooled data is the data that contains pooling of time series and cross-sectional observations (combination of time series and cross-section data) (Gujarati, 2003). The pooled data analysis has many advantages over the pure time series or pure cross sectional data. It generates more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency (Gujarati, 2003). The underlying assumption behind the pooled analysis is that, the intercept value and the coefficients of all the explanatory variables are the same for all the firms, as well as they are constant over time (no specific time or individual aspects). It also assumes that the error term captures the differences between the firms (across-sectional units) over the time. However, (Gujarati, 2003) has pointed out that these assumptions are highly restrictive. He argues that although of it is simplicity and advantages, the pooled regression may distort the true picture of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables across the firms. Pooled model will be simply estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS). However, OLS will be appropriate if no individual (firm) or time specific effects exist. If they exist, the unobserved effects of unobserved individual and time specific factors on dependent variable can be accommodated by using one of the panel data techniques.   According to (Gujarati, 2003) panel data is a special form of pooled data in which the same cross-sectional unit is surveyed over time. It helps researchers to substantially minimize the problems that arise when there is an omitted variables problems such as time and individual-specific variables and to provide robust parameter estimates than time series and (or) cross sectional data. All the empirical models that have been tested by using pooled data analysis and tested again on the basis of panel data analysis techniques (Fixed Effects and Random Effects).   3.3.2 The fixed effects model (FEM) Fixed effects technique allows control for unobserved heterogeneity which describes individual specific effects not captured by observed variables. According to Gujarati (2003) the fixed effect model takes into account the specific effect of each firm â€Å"the individuality† by allowing the intercept vary across individuals (firms), but each individual’s intercept does not vary over time. However, it still assumes that the slope coefficients are constant across individuals or over time. Two methods used to control for the unobserved fixed effects within the fixed effects model; the first differences and Least Square Dummy variables (LSDV) methods.  For the purposes of the current study, (LSDV) was used where; two sets of dummy variables (industry, and year dummy variables). The additional dummy variables control for variables that are constant across firms but change over time. Therefore, the combine time and individual (firm) fixed effects model eliminates the omitted variables bias arising both from unobserved factors that are constant over time and unobserved factors that are constant across firms. However, fixed effects model consumes the degrees of freedom, if estimated by the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) method and, too many dummy variables are introduced (Gujarati, 2003). Furthermore, with too many variables used as regressors in the models, there is the possibility of multicollinearity. It is worth noting that OLS technique used in estimating fixed effects model. 3.3.3 The Random Effects Model (REM) By contrast, fixed effects model, the unobserved effects in random effects model is captured by the error term (ÃŽ µit) consisting of an individual specific one (ui) and an overall component (vit) which is the combined time series and cross-section error. Moreover, it treats the intercept coefficient as a random variable with a mean value (ÃŽ ±0) of all cross-sectional (firms) intercepts and the error component represents the random deviation of individual intercept from this mean value (Gujarati, 2003). Consequently, the individual differences in the intercept values of each firm are reflected in the error term (ui). On the other hand, the Generalized Least Square (GLS) used in estimating random affects model.  This is because the GLS technique takes into account the different correlation structure of the error term in the Random Effect Model (REM) (Gujarati, 2003). 3.3.4 Statistical specification tests The study uses three specification tests to identify which empirical method is the best. These tests are used for testing the fixed effect model versus the pooled model (F-statistics), the random effect model versus pooled model (Lagrange Multiplier test) (LM), and the fixed effect model versus the random effect model (Hausman test). The following sub-sections offer brief disc Impacts on Agency Cost Theory Impacts on Agency Cost Theory The main purpose of this research is to investigate how the determinants of the capital structure (leverage) and the dividend payout policy impact the agency cost theory. Literature review part picked up the relevant material related to agency theory, leverage, and dividends payout policy. The literature review section goes through the agency cost literature, and explores the financial policies; the capital structure (leverage), and the dividend payout policy and that these policies would influence the agency cost theory. 2.1 Agency theory Literature The notion of the agency theory is widely used in economics, finance, marketing, legal, and social sciences; Jensen and Meckling (1976) initiated and developed it. Capital structure (leverage) for the firms is determined by agency costs, i.e., costs related to conflict of interests between various groups including managers, which have claims on the firm’s resources (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency relationship as â€Å"a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent), to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent† pp.308. Assuming that both parties utility maximizes, the agents are not possible to act in the best interest of the principal. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) contended that the principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent, and by incurring monitoring costs (pecuniary and non pecuniary), which are designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the agency costs are unavoidable, since the agency costs are borne entirely by the owner. Jensen and Meckling (1976) contended that the owner is motivated to see these costs minimized. Authors who initiated and developed the agency theory have argued that if the owner manages a wholly owned firm, then he can make operating decisions that maximise his utility. The agency costs are generated if the owner manager sells equity claims on the firms, which are identical to his.  It also generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he then bears only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out maximizing his own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested two types of conflicts in the firm; First of all, the conflict between shareholders and managers arises because managers hold less than a hundred percent of the residual claim. Therefore, they do not capture the entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, but they do bear the entire cost of these activities. For example, managers can invest less effort in managing firm resources and may be able to transfer firm resources to their own, personal benefit, i.e., by consuming â€Å"perquisites† such as a fringe benefits. The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these activities but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers over indulge in these interests relative to the level that would maximize the firm value. This inefficiency reduced the large fraction of the equity owned by the manager. Holding constant the manager’s absolute investment in the firm, increases in the fraction of the firm financed by debt increases the manager’s share of the equity and mitigates the loss from conflict between the managers and shareholders. Furthermore, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of free cash flow available to managers to engage in these types of interests.  As a result, this reduction of the conflict between managers and shareholders will constitute the benefit of debt financing. Second, they also suggested that the conflict between debt holders and shareholders arises because the debt contract, gives shareholders an incentive to invest sub optimally. Especially when the debt contract provides that, if an investment yields large returns, well above the face value of the debt, shareholders capture most of the gain. However, if the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences. Therefore, shareholders may benefit from investing in very risky projects, even if they are under valued; such investments result in an adverse in the value of debt. Lasfer (1995) argued that debt exacerbates the conflict between debt holders and shareholders. Shareholders will benefit from investments in risky projects at the expense of debt holders.  If the investment yields higher return than the face value of debt, shareholders capture most of the gain, however, if the investment fails, debt holders lose, given that. Therefore, shareholders protected by the limited liability. On the other hand, if the benefits captured by debt holders reduce the returns to shareholders, then an incentive to reject positive net present projects has created. Thus, the debt contract gives shareholders incentives to invest sub optimally. In addition, Myers (1977) argued that the firms with many growth opportunities should not be financed by debt, to reduce the negative net value projects.   Furthermore, some of arguments have been debated that the magnitude of the agency costs varies among firms. It will depend on the tastes of managers, the ease with which they can exercise their own preferences as opposed to value maximization in decision making, and the costs of monitoring and bonding activities. Therefore, the agency costs depend upon the cost of measuring the manager’s performance and evaluating it (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). (Jensen, 1986) either points out that when firms make their financing decision, they evaluate the advantages that may arise from the resolution of the conflicts between managers, shareholders and from long run tax shields.   In addition, Lasfer (1995) argues that debt finance creates a motivation for managers to work harder and make better investment decisions. On the other hand, debt works as a disciplining tool, because default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation. Debt also generates information that can be used by investors to evaluate major operating decisions including liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Jensen (1986) debated that when using debt without retention of the proceeds of the issue, bonds the managers to meet their promise to pay future cash flows to the debt holders. Thus, debt can be an effective substitute for dividends. By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers are bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by simple dividend increases. Consequently, managers give recipients of the debt the right to take the firm to the bankruptcy court if they do not maintain their commitment to make the interest and principle payments. Thus, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. Jensen (1986) claimed that these control effects of debt are a potential determinant of capital structure. In practice, it is possible to reduce the owner manager non pecuniary benefits; by using these instruments external auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment of incentive compensation systems serve to identify the manager’s interests more closely with those of the outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1986) suggested that leverage and dividend may act as a substitute mechanism to reduce the agency costs. Agency cost models predict that dividend payments can reduce the problems related to information asymmetry. Dividend payments might be consider also as a mechanism to reduce cash flow under management control, and help to mitigate the agency problems (Rozeff, 1982, and Easterbrook, 1984). Therefore, paying dividends may have a positive impact on the firms value. â€Å"Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs related to the principal agent relationship, one way to reduce agency costs is to increase dividends† Baker and Powell (1999). They also claim that firm use the dividends use as a tool to monitor the management performance. Moreover, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that agency costs exist in firms because managers may not always want to maximize shareholder’s wealth due to the separation of ownership and control. Jensen (1986) addresses the free cash flow theory, in terms of this theory the conflict of interest between managers and stockholders is rooted in the presence of informational and self interest behavior. He defines the free cash flow as â€Å"cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital† (Jensen,1986). Within the context of the free cash flow hypothesis, firms prefer to increase their dividends and distribute the excess free cash flow in order to reduce agency costs. Consequently, markets react positively to this type of information. This theory is attractive because it is consistent with the evidence about investment and financing decisions (Jensen, 1986, Frankfurter and Wood, 2002). 2.2 Leverage Literature This section reviews the determinants of capital structure by different relevant literatures. Titman and Wessels (1988) study is considered to be one of the leading studies in the developed markets. They tried to extend the empirical work in capital structure theory by examining a much broader set of capital structure theories, and to analyze measures of short term, long term, and convertible debt. The data covers the US industrial companies from 1974 to 1982, and they used a factor analytic approach for estimating the impact of unobservable attributes on the choice of corporate debt ratios. As a result, the study confirms these factors, collateral values of assets, non-debt tax shields, growth, and uniqueness of the business, industry classification, firm size, and firm profitability. They also found that there is a negative relationship between debt levels and the uniqueness of the business. In addition, short term debt ratios have a negative relationship to firm size. However, they do not provide support for the effect on debt ratios arising from non debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value of assets, and growth. In Jordan, Al-Khouri and Hmedat (1992) aimed to find the effect of the earnings variability on capital structure of Jordanian corporations from the period from 1980 to 1988. They included 65 firms. The study used a multivariate regression approach with financial leverage as the dependent variable measured in three ways; first, long term debt over total assets, secondly, short term debt over total assets, and finally, short term debt plus long term debt over total assets. The standard deviation of the earnings variability and the size of the firm measured as independent variables. They concluded that the firm size is considered as a significant factor in determining the capital structure of the firm, and insignificant relationship between the earning variability and financial leverage of the firm. Furthermore, they suggest that the type of industry is not considered as a significant factor in determining the capital structure of the firm. Rajan and Zingales (1995) provided international evidence about the determinants of capital structure. They examined the capital structure in other countries related to factors similar to those that influence United States firms. The database contains 2583 companies in the G7 countries. They used regression analysis with the firm’s leverage (total debt divided by total debt plus total equity) as the dependent variable. Tangible assets, market to book ratio, firm size, and firm profitability used as independent variables. They found that in market bases firms with a lot of fixed assets are not highly levered, however, they supported that a positive relationship exists between tangible assets, and firms size, and capital structure (leverage). On the contrary, they confirmed that there is a negative relationship between leverage and the market to book ratio, and profitability. From the capital structure literature, Ozkan (2001) also investigated that the determinants of the target capital structure of firms and the role of the adjustment process in the UK using a sample of 390 firms. The multiple regression approach (panel data) was used to measure the debts by total debt to total assets, on the one hand. He also used in his model, non debt tax shield, firm size, liquidity, firm profitability, and firm growth as an independent variables. He confirmed that the profit, liquidity, non debt tax shield, and growth opportunities have a negative relationship to capital structure (leverage). Finally, he supported that there is a positive effect arising from size of firms on leverage. The study provided evidence that the UK firms have long term target leverage ratios and that they adjust quickly to their target ratios. The study by Booth et al. (2001) is considered as a one of the leading studies in the developing countries. It aimed to assess whether capital structure theory is applicable across developing countries with different institutional structures. The data include balance sheets and income statements for the largest companies in each selected country from the year 1980 to 1990. It included 10 developing countries: India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Jordan, and Korea. The study used multivariate regression analysis with dependent variables; total debt ratio, long term book debt ratio, and long term market to debt ratio. The independent variables are; average tax rate, tangibility, business risk, firm size, firm profitability, and market to book ratio. Booth et al. found that the more profitable the firm the lower the debt ratio, regardless how the debt ratio is defined. In addition, the higher the tangible assets mix, the higher is the long term debt ratio but the smaller is the total debt ratio. Finally, it concluded that debt ratios in developing countries seem to be affected in the same way by the same set of variables that are significant in developed countries. Voulgaris et al. (2004) investigated the determinants of capital structure for Greek manufacturing firms. The study used panel data of two random samples one for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) including 143 firms and another for large sized enterprises (LSEs) including 75 firms for the period from 1988 to 1996. It used a leverage model as a dependent variable (short run debt ratio, long run debt ratio, and total debt ratio). On the other hand, It used firm size, asset structure, profitability, growth rate, stock level, and receivables as independent variables. The study suggested that there are similarities and differences in the determinants of capital structure among the two samples. The similarities include that the firm size and growth opportunities positively related to leverage. While, they confirm that the profitability has a negative relationship to leverage. Moreover, they pointed out the differences that the inventory period, and account receivables collection period have been found as determinants of debt in SMEs but not in LSEs. Liquidity doest not affect LSEs leverage, but it affects the SMEs. Finally, they also suggested that there is a positive relationship between profit margins and short term debt ratio only for SMEs. Voulgaris et al. (2004) have debated this arguments as; ‘‘the attitude of banks toward small sized firms should be changed so they provide easier access to long-term debt financing’’. In addition, â€Å"enactment of rules that will allow transparency of operations in the Greek stock market and a healthier development of the newly established capital market for SMEs will assist Greek firms into achieving a stronger capital structure’’. 2.3 Dividends payout ratio literature Dividend payout ratios vary between firms and the dividend payout policy will impact the agency cost theory. Rozeff (1982) investigated in his study that the dividends policy will be rationalize by appealing the transaction cost and agency cost associated with external finance. Moreover, Rozeff (1982) had found evidences supporting how the agency costs influence the dividends payout ratio. He found that the firms have distributed lower dividend payout ratios when they have a higher revenue growth, because this growth leads to higher investment expenditures.  This evidence supports the view of the investment policy affect on the dividend policy; the reason for that influences is that would the external finance be costly. Conversely, he found that the firms have distributed higher dividends payouts when insiders hold a lower portion of the equity and (or) a greater numbers of shareholders own the outside equity. Rozeff (1982) pointed out that this evidence supports that the dividend payments are part of the firm’s optimum monitoring and that bonding package reduces the agency costs. Moreover, if the agency cost declines when the dividend payout does and if the transaction cost of external finance increases when the dividend payout is increased as well, then minimization of these costs will lead to a unique optimum for a given firm. In addition, Hansen, Kumar, and Shome [HKS], (1994) pointed out the relevance of the monitoring theory for explaining the dividends policy of regulated electric utilities. From an agency cost perspective, they emphasized their ideas that the dividends promote monitoring of what they call the shareholders regulator conflict. Therefore, it is a monitoring role of dividends. On the contrary, Easterbrook’s (1984) has noted that the dividends monitoring of the shareholders managers conflict. They also have observed that the utilities firms have a discipline of monitoring mechanism for controlling agency cost, depending on the relative cost effectiveness of those costs (Crutchly and Hensen, 1989). The regulator process will impact the conflict between the shareholders and mangers, by mitigate the managers’ power to appropriate shareholders’ wealth and consume perquisites (Hansen et al. 1994). On the other hand, they argued this issue by the cost-plus concept, regulators may set into motion of managerial incentive structure that potentially conflicts with shareholders interests, this concept solve the shareholders-regulators concept since the sources of the conflict lies in differences in the perceptions of what constitutes fair cost plus. Therefore, the regulation can control some of the agency cost while exacerbating others. In their study, they conduct also that the managers and shareholders of unregulated firms have a several mechanisms whether, internal or external, for controlling agency cost. In addition, they observed that the dividend policy to reduce the agency theory is not limited, depending on their findings they suggested that the cost of dividend payout policy might be below the costs paid by other types of firm. In fact the utilities company maintain high debt ratio that would maintain as well as equity agency costs. Aivazian et al. (2003b) compare the dividend policy behaviour of eight emerging markets with dividend policies in the US firms in the period from 1980 to 1990. The sample included firms from; Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. They found that it is difficult to predict dividend changes for such emerging markets. This is because the quality of firms with reputations for cutting dividends is somehow similar to those who increase their dividends, than for the US control sample. In addition, current dividends are less sensitive to past dividends than for the US sample of firms. They also found that the Lintner model[1] does not work well for the sample of emerging markets. These results indicate that the institutional frameworks in these emerging markets make dividend policy a weak technique for signaling future earnings and reducing agency costs than for the US sample of firms. Furthermore, Omran and Pointon (2004) investigated the role of dividend policy in determining share prices, the determinants of payout ratios, and the factors that affect the stability of dividends for a sample of 94 Egyptian firms. They found that retentions are more important than dividends in firms with actively traded shares, but that accounting book value is more important than dividends and earnings for non-actively traded firms. However, when they combined both the actively traded and non-traded firms, they found that dividends are more important than earnings. In the determinants of payout ratios, they found that there is a negative relationship between the leverage ratio and market to book ratio, tangibility, and firm size on the one hand, to the payout ratios in actively traded firms. On the contrary, they also found that there is a positive relationship between the business risk, market to book and firm size (measured by total assets) to payout ratios in non-actively traded firms. Furthermore, for the whole sample, leverage has a positive relationship with payout ratios, while firm size (measured by market capitalization) is negatively related to payout ratios. Finally, the stepwise logistic regression analysis shows that decreasing dividends is associated with lack of liquidity and overall profitability. In addition, increasing dividends is associated with higher overall profitability. 2.4 Summary In this chapter the relevant literatures addressing the reviews of the agency cost theory related to the financial policies. It also gives a theoretical background on how the conflicts of interests arise between the agents (managers) and the principal (shareholders). The second and third sections present the determinants of leverage and dividend payout policy. The following chapter will go through the description of data, and data methodology was employed for this dissertation. 3. Methodology, Research Design and Data Description The aim of the current study is to investigate firstly, the empirical evidence of the determinants of leverage and dividend policy under the agency theory concept for the period 2002-2007. The majority of the previous studies in the field of capital structure have made in the context of developed countries such as USA and UK. It is important to investigate the main determinants of leverage and dividend policy in developing countries where, capital markets, are less developed, less competitive and suffering from the lack of compatible regulations and sufficient supervision This chapter will explain the research methodology of this study. This chapter also identifies the sample of the study. Moreover, it presents an illustration of the econometric techniques that have been employed. In addition, this chapter gives a brief explanation of the specification tests used in the study to identify which technique is the best for the data set. This chapter structured as follows; Section (3.1) presents data description.  Section (3.2) presents the sample of the study. Section (3.3) discusses the econometric techniques employed in the study. Finally, Section (3.4) provides a brief summary. 3.1 Data Description The data used in the study are secondary data for companies listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period of 2002-2007. The data was extracted from the firm’s annual reports, and from Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly Companies Guide, and Amman Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical Bulletins). Data is readily available in the form of CD and on the website of the Amman Stock Exchange. The reason for the study period selection was to minimize the missing observations for the sample companies. Moreover, a different reporting system has been used since 2000. The application of the new reporting system was the result of the transparency act which was launched in 1999, and forced all companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange to disclose their financial information and publish their annual reports according to the International Financial Reporting Standards. In other words, this data series for the period from 2002-2007 was chosen in terms of consistency and comparability purposes. 3.2 Sample of the study The sample of the study consists of the Jordanian Manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for the period of 2002-2007. The total number of the companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2007 was 215. Officially, these companies are divided into four main economic sectors; Banks sector, Insurance sector, Services sector and finally Industrial sector. Moreover, this study is concerned only with Jordanian manufacturing companies that their stocks are traded in the organized market. It is important to note that the capital structure of financial firms has special characteristic when compared to the capital structure of non financial firms, they also have special tax treatment (Lester, 1995). On the other hand, the financial firms have a higher leverage rate, which may tend to make the analysis results biased. Moreover, financial firms their leverage is affected by investor insurance schemes (Rajan and Zingals, 1995). For these reasons, the potential sample of the study consists of non financial (Manufacturing) companies that are still listed in Amman Stock Exchange. The total number of industrial companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2007 was 88 companies, which are 40.93% of the total number of the companies listed in that market. The study conducts the following criteria in selecting the sample upon the Jordanian manufacturing companies by excluding all the firms that was incorporated after year 2002, and all the firms that have merged or acquired during this period, further, the firms have liquidated or delisted by the Amman Stock Exchange, and finally, the study have also excluded the firms that have information missing for that period. The application for those criteria has resulted in 52 samples of manufacturing companies. The data for the variables that are included in the study models is tested using three different econometric techniques which will be discuss briefly in the next sections. 3.3 Econometrics techniques Hairs et al. (1998) argued that the application of econometrics technique depends on the nature of data employed in the study, and to what extent it would be realised to the research objectives. In order to find a best and adequate data model, the current study employs pooled data technique and panel data analysis which is usually estimated by either fixed effect technique or random effects technique.  The following sections provide a brief discussion on the econometrics techniques that the current study uses to estimate the empirical models. 3.3.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique All the models used in the study have been tested by the pooled data analysis technique. The pooled data is the data that contains pooling of time series and cross-sectional observations (combination of time series and cross-section data) (Gujarati, 2003). The pooled data analysis has many advantages over the pure time series or pure cross sectional data. It generates more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency (Gujarati, 2003). The underlying assumption behind the pooled analysis is that, the intercept value and the coefficients of all the explanatory variables are the same for all the firms, as well as they are constant over time (no specific time or individual aspects). It also assumes that the error term captures the differences between the firms (across-sectional units) over the time. However, (Gujarati, 2003) has pointed out that these assumptions are highly restrictive. He argues that although of it is simplicity and advantages, the pooled regression may distort the true picture of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables across the firms. Pooled model will be simply estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS). However, OLS will be appropriate if no individual (firm) or time specific effects exist. If they exist, the unobserved effects of unobserved individual and time specific factors on dependent variable can be accommodated by using one of the panel data techniques.   According to (Gujarati, 2003) panel data is a special form of pooled data in which the same cross-sectional unit is surveyed over time. It helps researchers to substantially minimize the problems that arise when there is an omitted variables problems such as time and individual-specific variables and to provide robust parameter estimates than time series and (or) cross sectional data. All the empirical models that have been tested by using pooled data analysis and tested again on the basis of panel data analysis techniques (Fixed Effects and Random Effects).   3.3.2 The fixed effects model (FEM) Fixed effects technique allows control for unobserved heterogeneity which describes individual specific effects not captured by observed variables. According to Gujarati (2003) the fixed effect model takes into account the specific effect of each firm â€Å"the individuality† by allowing the intercept vary across individuals (firms), but each individual’s intercept does not vary over time. However, it still assumes that the slope coefficients are constant across individuals or over time. Two methods used to control for the unobserved fixed effects within the fixed effects model; the first differences and Least Square Dummy variables (LSDV) methods.  For the purposes of the current study, (LSDV) was used where; two sets of dummy variables (industry, and year dummy variables). The additional dummy variables control for variables that are constant across firms but change over time. Therefore, the combine time and individual (firm) fixed effects model eliminates the omitted variables bias arising both from unobserved factors that are constant over time and unobserved factors that are constant across firms. However, fixed effects model consumes the degrees of freedom, if estimated by the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) method and, too many dummy variables are introduced (Gujarati, 2003). Furthermore, with too many variables used as regressors in the models, there is the possibility of multicollinearity. It is worth noting that OLS technique used in estimating fixed effects model. 3.3.3 The Random Effects Model (REM) By contrast, fixed effects model, the unobserved effects in random effects model is captured by the error term (ÃŽ µit) consisting of an individual specific one (ui) and an overall component (vit) which is the combined time series and cross-section error. Moreover, it treats the intercept coefficient as a random variable with a mean value (ÃŽ ±0) of all cross-sectional (firms) intercepts and the error component represents the random deviation of individual intercept from this mean value (Gujarati, 2003). Consequently, the individual differences in the intercept values of each firm are reflected in the error term (ui). On the other hand, the Generalized Least Square (GLS) used in estimating random affects model.  This is because the GLS technique takes into account the different correlation structure of the error term in the Random Effect Model (REM) (Gujarati, 2003). 3.3.4 Statistical specification tests The study uses three specification tests to identify which empirical method is the best. These tests are used for testing the fixed effect model versus the pooled model (F-statistics), the random effect model versus pooled model (Lagrange Multiplier test) (LM), and the fixed effect model versus the random effect model (Hausman test). The following sub-sections offer brief disc

Was British Industry Inefficient? :: essays research papers

By the 1870s, Britain’s economy was enviable by the rest of the world as they set the pace in industrialising. However, her pre-eminence (GPD per capita exceeded that of America by one-third) wavered in this period preceding World War I. To determine whether this change was due to inefficiencies in British industry requires recognition of the contrasts between Britain and America. Although America’s economy improved vis-à  -vis Britain’s, this was out of Britain’s control due to exogenous variables.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Neoclassical economic growth theory states that technology is a precursor to higher living standards and productivity gains. Britain and America were very different economies and as a result faced very different economic prospects in the late 1800s. For instance, the population in Britain grew by nearly two-fold between 1860 and 1910 whilst the America trebled. Britain’s domestic market was not only smaller, but consumer demands were much less homogenous than in America due primarily to cultural ties and wage inequality. Many sole proprietorships and partnerships developed in response to these tastes through niche markets, producing highly specialised goods. America had a national, homogenous market in which large corporations profited from economies of scale and mass production. Factor differences between the two nations resulted in Britain benefiting from her highly skilled labour, two-thirds of which were employed with companies of less than 250 people. America, with its abundance of land and raw materials, focused on using capital intensities in production rather than relying on the relatively more expensive skilled labour. One similarity of both nations was the decline of employment in agriculture by the late 19th century, which freed up labour to be utilised in other industries.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Growth opportunities in British industry were hampered in several ways. The tendency around the 1870s was for Britain to encourage small, specialised companies to compete primarily in staple industries such as cotton, coal, iron and steal, and shipbuilding. The high level of specialised products prevented technological transfers from overseas in developing markets and these companies did not benefit from economies of scale. British entrepreneurs were less likely than their American counterparts to discover innovative techniques, such as the assembly line used successful in car manufacturing by Henry Ford in the early 1900s. This lack of adaptability was not a blemish on British industry because it was not relevant to consumer demands at home. Also, the implementation of a free trade policy in Britain, despite its merits, made it exceedingly difficult for British industries to compete in the world market when nations such as America and Germany pursued protectioni sm to shield ‘infant industries’ from international competition via tariffs.

Essay --

Iowa State University has a record breaking number of students enrolled for the 2013 school year. With such a boom in new students, ISU has to find a place to house these students. Housing development companies like Breckenridge Land Acquisition of Texas have taken on the daunting task of building new student housing in Ames. Breckenridge has run into several roadblocks that have delayed building. These delays mean that prospective students like George Johnson of Sioux City, IA are still being turned away due to housing constraints. â€Å"I was ecstatic when I was accepted into Iowa State, but when they said they couldn’t get my housing in order for the school year I had to find somewhere else to go,† Johnson said. ISU reached its fifth consecutive year of growth with 33,241 students attending. That’s a 2,201 student increase just from last year. A problem arises with this booming population of students. Iowa State University has too many students that it can’t house. ISU has utilized other housing developments around Ames, such as Legacy apartments in Campustown, and Maricopa apartments in West Ames, to help with the overflow. Even with all of the new acquired properties added in to ISU’s housing, there is still a need for student housing on and off campus. Companies like Breckenridge offer a solution to this problem. Breckenridge is a subdivision of Aspen Heights, a developer of duplex and Craftsmen style townhomes. Breckenridge representatives purchased 48 acres of property on what used to be the old Ames Middle School. The property sold at auction for $2.3 million last December. Their proposed plan for building on the land could house up to 900 students. Their plan has caused a great deal of controversy in the area... ...as steadily decreased since 2000. According to the Ames Chamber of Commerce, Ames High School enrollment has dropped from 1695 students in 2000 to 1495 in 2012. Former member of Ames School Board Patricia Brown said, â€Å"We want families to get kids into the school system so that we can support our Ames schools.† So what does this mean for Iowa State students? No new development can begin on the property until the lawsuit comes to a close. Also, without the proper zoning regulations amended, Breckenridge cannot develop any new land on the property. This means no new student housing on the land for the foreseeable future. This means that students like George Johnson may find that they have nowhere to go. â€Å"It was a major setback. I’m taking classes at DMACC at the moment, but hopefully I can get my housing situation figured out by next year,† said George Johnson.

Saatchi

Now the world has changed in terms of media proliferation and, ultimately, choice. The consumer's in charge now. † So what exactly are Lovers? According to the website a Alveolar is a brand that is infused with three ingredients: Mystery, Sensuality and Intimacy. So far, so intangible (and quite confusing). But once Anastasia explains the concept it becomes almost childishly simple. â€Å"Lovers isn't some theoretical science that dazzles with the complexities – it's based on a very simple premise: We are emotional beings. There's a quote by (neurologist Donald]Canine that we sometimes refer to: â€Å"The essential deference between emotion and reason Is that emotion leads to action while reason leads to conclusions. â€Å"† The consumer purchasing the product Is, of course, the action that every manufacturer or service provider wants. So the fundamental questions remain: What is the best way to achieve this? And who are the best examples? â€Å"Globally there are lots! Harley- Davidson, Apple, Struck, Coke are just a few. People change their lifestyles for Harley, they become weekend warriors – it takes them away from themselves.And actually Harley isn't faster or technologically better than the other guys but it taps into deep emotional territory and that's what Lovers are about. They don't talk about ‘we're faster' or ‘our detergents wash brighter' and all those traditional ways of marketing, it's on a much more round Twelve years ago Stating & Stating global chief executive Kevin Roberts drew back the curtain on the latest phase toward successful consumer marketing, opening the world's eyes to a very contemporary phenomenon. He called -?Lovers: The â€Å"Lovers isn't some theoretical science that dazzles with the came. Sixties – it s based on Avery simple premise: We are emotional beings. † personal level. It's an understanding of what's important to people and what they care about. † â€Å"Look at Apple; whether it's piccolos or imams they tap into something that's much more sensual, it's a desire you want to have an Imax – as a creative person it's the currency, if you don't have one there's something wrong. Take ‘Pods, people can argue until they're blue in the face that a competitor is faster, better, cheaper, lasts longer, has more memory – I know all that but it doesn't matter, I still onto give up my pod. â€Å"Struck is into sensuality and intimacy. They've marketed themselves as ‘The Third Place'; there's Home, there's Work and there's Struck, Now, other people might say ‘but look, we have better coffee', but that's not really the point. People don't Just go there for the -? coffee, people go there' _†, for the an ideal example of how tapping into consumers emotionally is paying off. The mark is the market leader by sales and is enjoying double-digit growth year-on-year.Rather than focusing the campaign on the ‘dry' asp ect of the nappy the team shifted attention to how it helps babies to develop, â€Å"It's about understanding what's important to the people who are buying Pampers. Kids' brains process the day in thriftless, SO a good night is hugely important to a baby's development, So the nappies have been improved for comfort and dryness to allow the baby to get the best night's sleep: When you explain development to a mother and you talk about how important a good night's sleep is for their child, 49 then they get it.When they understand that, there's way Tanat tannery to going to do what's best for their kid. † Such seemingly small step represents a fundamental shift in the way products are presented to the public. It is no longer a matter of what is being offered, but rather how it will directly affect the purchaser's lifestyle. It is a concept that is catching on in boardrooms worldwide, according to Anastasia sees are among the first to see the benefits – it is only in the co mpany marketing departments that it meets resistance: â€Å"Lovers is to the consumer the notion of loyalty beyond reason.If you have that you resented with the sheer amount of choice on offer, whether on satellite television, terrestrial radio or the internet. â€Å"It's easier to market to people than to connect with people,† he explains, â€Å"but in the attraction economy you have to inspire, motivate, connect with – and these are words that you don't normally use as marketers. You need a big idea that people can engage with and they come from deep insights. † Getting to this stage does require some groundwork, Anastasia admits that before brands can become Lovers they have to already benefit from consumers' respect.Some companies can build that up quickly but it normally does take time. â€Å"Take Coke for example, that's a Lovers. If you take a generic brand off the shelves people will Just switch to another, but if you take a Alveolar off the shelves th ey'll revolt! They'll say -?you can't do that, that's MY brand†. When Coke changed their recipe there's was an uproar, they were forced to change it back because the public wouldn't accept their ‘messing about' with ‘their' brand. † Regionally Middle Eastern companies have benefited greatly from the dynamism of global companies arriving on the scene.Homegrown brands such as Emirates and can charge premium prices; pods are a premium, Harley charge a premium. So there's a business case for it; people are prepared to pay if they can make a connection to ten product. Ana tannery nappy to Decease teen see Tanat there's value to it, they'd be worried if it was cheaper. There are whole studies that show that Alveolar brands offer greater returns. † So why aren't all companies' marketing strategies being transferred by this revolution? Well, in order to gauge exactly how different products are received, research methods have to undergo a horrors change.As Anast asia puts it you have to -?go from the zoo to the Jungle. † Rather than convening focus groups into sterile boardrooms to canvas opinions, researchers have to venture into people's homes and work-places. Reliance on the traditional ‘media schedule target group' philosophy fades almost into insignificance when So why aren't all companies' marketing strategies being transformed? Well, in order to gauge exactly how different products are received, research methods have to undergo a thorough change. As Anastasia puts it you have to â€Å"go from the zoo to he Jungle.

Painting Compare & Contrast Essay

In the painting, Brooklyn Bridge by Joseph Stella and the photo Brooklyn Bridge by Walker Evans a comparison of the two artistic figures, colors utilized, perception, painting verses film, and the mood each creates reveals that the oil on canvas that Joseph Stella is the more interesting presentation of the Brooklyn Bridge. The two artists portray the same subject in two totally different ways that change the mind and artistic finding of their audiences. The painting and the film depict the same bridge with different artistic views. The painting by Joseph Stella uses an assortment of colors while the film by Walker Evans is black and white. The film depicts a more realistic representation of the Brooklyn Bridge, while the painting embodies a more creative aspect of the Brooklyn Bridge. The colors Stella chose to use are a variety of different shades of blue, green, yellow, white, black, purple, and red. While using colors, the artist has the ability to create an entirely imaginative illustration of their focus. When Evans chose to use a black and white Gelatin silver print depiction of the Brooklyn Bridge, he restricted his ability to create an artistic view of it because he is only able to capture exactly what is seen through the lens of the camera. Evans was able to be creative by the choice of using black and white. The colors used in the film by Evans and the painting by Stella also create the mood of their audience. Stella uses vibrant and bright colors, which set an exciting and happy mood for the individual who is looking at it. When using bright colors, Stella was able to captivate her audience and make them feel welcome and blissful. Whenever eyes see something bright and colorful, a person’s mood can change in such a positive way. The vibrant colors chosen gave the audience the ability to see the Brooklyn Bridge in such a positive  light. Evans chose to use black and white, which creates a dull and dark mood for an audience. Black and white photos have the tendency to alter the audience’s mood and turn for the negative. When looking at Evans film of the Brooklyn Bridge, it appears to be dark, gloomy, and sad looking. The black and white colors chosen give off such negative vibes and can make an audience never want to visit the Brooklyn Bridge because of the mood it illustr ates. Perspective plays a major role in an artist’s demonstration of their focus and their ability to show off their skills. The use of the worm’s view gives a different perspective of the same subject because of the placement and angle that comes from such. Stella’s use of the worm’s eye view gives the audience an asymmetrical and distinctive perspective of the Brooklyn Bridge that one would usually not see if they were to look at other images of such. Evans use of the birds eye perspective tends to take away from the creativity of the image because if they were to go visit the Brooklyn Bridge in person, they would not see that same view. Perspective is vital because it tends to give the audience a different angle method and also gives the audience a chance to fathom while viewing the artwork. The difference in perspectives in this instance, create two diverse interpretations of the bridge. The bird’s eye view Evans chose to use constructs the height and length in a non-realistic manner, generating a distant viewpoint. The worm’s eye view in Stella’s painting provides the audience a realistic vision of the size of the bridge by exhibiting length and height at a particular angle. In the painting, Brooklyn Bridge by Joseph Stella and the photo Brooklyn Bridge by Walker Evans a comparison of the two artistic figures, colors utilized, perception, painting verses film, and the mood each creates reveals that the oil on canvas that Joseph Stella is the more interesting presentation of the Brooklyn Bridge. The two artists portray the same subject in two totally different ways that change the mind and artistic finding of their audiences. The artists were completely different in the ideas and effects used to depict the Brooklyn Bridge. They were both able to show their skills and artistic ability. Evans symmetrical, black and white,  life like film, and Stella’s vibrant bright colors, asymmetric painting were great depictions of the same Brooklyn Bridge. Work Cited Evans, Walker. â€Å"Brooklyn Bridge, New York, 1929.† Picturing America. Ed. Meredith Hindley. Washington: National Endowment for the Humanities, 2008. 69. Print. Stella, Joseph. â€Å"Brooklyn Bridge.† Picturing America. Ed. Meredith Hindley. Washington: National Endowment for the Humanities, 2008. 69. Print.

Ampalaya Coffee Essay

This investigatory project aims to prepare and also to make a coffee from the â€Å" Ampalaya Seeds†. We know that Ampalaya or also known as Bitter melon is known for as its bitterness and astringent taste , the bitter melon can see everywhere. This investigatory project encourage us students to make a coffee, as an alternative product . This study was conducted to determine the feasibility of the ampalaya seeds as coffee. The researchers used powdered Ampalaya seeds in this study. After researching and collecting the raw materials, the researchers were able to begin the experimentation. The coffee was obtained by drying, grinding, and roasting the seeds of ampalaya, and boiled. After boiling, the coffee was manually extracted with the use of a clean cloth. The study focuses on producing coffee out of ampalaya seeds. It does not aimed to determine which coffee (ampalaya seeds vs. commercial coffee) has more nutritional value or which is more nutritious. II. Acknowledgement. We would like to thank to the following person that are help us to start and to continuing this our Investigatory Project ,including the following to our ALMIGHTY GOD that help us and give us strength and knowledge to explain the main idea of this investigatory project . To our parents and also our friend who give us supports to finish our Investigatory Project. For our parents that supplies our needs , including the financial needs . THANK YOU !!!!!! Chapter 1: Introduction In our modern generation , many people in our country used coffee especially our grandparents and also our parents. Coffee is known as beverage to the majority of the people. It is known for its stimulating effect on the functions of the brain , thus making the drinker active . Variants of coffee flavors were already produced all throughout the world aiming for the discovery of alternative sources of coffee production . The coffee from ampalaya seeds help us to earn and save money . A. Background of the study Coffee alternatives have been famous since the last two decades due to economic crisis and experimentations for health and medical benefits. Any seeds that are edible when powdered can be used as an alternative source for coffee. The difference of the generic coffee from the seeds of the coffee plant from those of the alternatives is that it has a good amount of caffeine content. The similarity you can find in the alternatives and those of the original is that seeds contain carbohydrates which cause the aroma in roasted coffee. Ampalaya, on the other hand, is a crawling vine that grows mostly on tropical countries like the Philippines. It is said to be rich in iron, potassium, beta-carotene and other nutrients. It is also famous in treating diabetes because of its properties like polypeptide-P; a plant insulin that can lower blood sugar levels. Many researches on agricultural food chemistry convey that it provides nutritionally significant amounts of nutrients, minerals and amino acids that are needed for life. B. Objectives of the study B1. General Objectives 1. To determine if the ampalaya seeds have considerable characteristics of the products in terms of color, aroma, taste, and acidity. B2. Specific Objectives 1. To produce coffee using ampalaya seeds as the main ingredient. 2. To determine and compare the levels of acceptability of the coffee samples. C. Hypotheses NULL 1. There is no significant difference among the different ampalaya coffee samples developed in terms of their color, aroma, and taste. ALTERNATIVE 1. There is no significant difference among the different ampalaya coffee samples developed in terms of their acceptability. D. Significance of the study Momordica Charantia or ampalaya seeds contain iron and folic acid which are essential for the production of the red blood cells and the formulation of hemoglobin and myoglobin. Coffee is usually drunk hot, black or with cream and sugar and also drunk cold as iced coffee, specially summer. People are used of drinking coffee every morning to warmth their body and at night to avoid being sleepy. But coffee contains a stimulant called caffeine. The result of this will determine if the coffee made from ampalaya seeds can be use as a substitute for the commercial coffee. This study aimed to produce coffee using ampalaya seeds as substitute. The study was important because ampalaya is abundant in the Philippines. The product may be an anti-diabetes coffee but it is not the main concern of the study. Everybody can benefit of the result of the study unless a coffee drinker. It would recycle the ampalaya seeds instead of being thrown away which a lot of people consider it as waste. E. Scope and limitation The proposed study was limited to producing coffee out of ampalaya (Momordica charantia Linn. ) seeds. Three samples were prepared with different ampalaya seed concentration and same amount of water for comparison purposes in which one of the samples was pure commercial coffee. The samples were processed by the basic methods of making coffee: roasting, grinding, and brewing.

Principles of Economics Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words - 2

Principles of Economics - Essay Example At ceteris peribus, an increase in the prices of alcohol will cause a fall in the quantity demanded and consumed of a product (Becker, 2001). This would help mitigate the economic impacts of over consumption of alcohol. However, the economists must put into consideration the fact that the demand curve of alcohol is normally inelastic given the fact that it is addictive. They therefore have to realize that an increase in the tax level may lead to a small decline in the quantity of the product consumed. The second option that can be pursued by an economist is moral persuasion. In this case, economists will prefer explaining the marginal cost and marginal benefits of consuming alcohol. In this case, the marginal cost will be higher than the marginal benefits hence economists will promote campaigns against the use of alcohol (Frank & Bernanke, 2007). They will therefore influence the enactment of legislation to bar teenagers from using alcohol; limit the number of drinking hours among ot her measures that reduce the consumption level. When some drugs are prescribed for use, they will influence the demand and supply of other products. For instance, the demand for products used in the manufacture of a drug will increase if the quantity of the drug prescribed has been increased. ... The elasticity of the two curves will determine the effectiveness of the policies formulated to regulate the performance of the economy. A shift in the supply curve will lead to a change in the new equilibrium point. If the demand curve were inelastic, a huge shift in the supply curve would result into relatively small changes in the equilibrium price (Boyes & Melvin, 2008). Elasticity of the demand curve will therefore influence the economic impact of the shift in the supply curve. For instance, a shift in the supply curve would only result in an increase in the equilibrium price if the demand curve were perfectly inelastic. Policymakers will therefore determine the effectiveness of their decisions when considering the steepness of the demand curve (Frank & Bernanke, 2007). Similarly, the elasticity of the supply curve will influence the net effect of a shift in the demand curve. Where the supply is inelastic, a shift in the demand curve will cause little or no change in the equilib rium quantity because even with an increased demand, suppliers will not be able to expand the quantities supplied. Prices will therefore increase but the quantity supplied will remain relatively constant. The elasticity of either the demand and supply curves are normally important when formulating policies aimed at influencing economic performance i.e. the government can increase the taxes imposed on goods with inelastic demand because this would not significantly affect the amount of the good consumed (Becker, 2001). For an increasing cost industry, entry of a new firm will result in an increase in the unit cost of production. When a firm enters the market, it will cause the prices of the resources used in